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IN T!IE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
LITTLE AMERICA REFINING
COMPANY,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

CASE NO. 17331

JESSE ALBERT LEYBA,
Defendant, and
SVEN HEIMBERG,
DefendantRespondent.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for property damage arising out of a
collision with plaintiff's service station by a vehicle driven
by defendant Sven Heimberg,

following a collision between the

Heimberg vehicle and a vehicle driven by defendant Jesse Albert
Leyba.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.

From a directed verdict

and judgment for defendant Heimberg at the close of plaintiff's
evidence, plaintiff appeals.

Default judgment was entered against

defendant Leyba for failure to appear or answer plaintiff's
Complaint.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the directed verdict u
favor of defendant Heimberg, and a new trial on the issues in
this case.

Defendant Leyba is not a party to this appeal,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Yelling and Throwing Firecrackers

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on April 2, 1979, the ind:
vidual defendants were each driving pickup trucks northbow.d
South State Street in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County (T. L
121).

Occupants of the vehicle driven by defendant Leyba

(hereinafter referred to as the "Leyba vehicle") yelled at
the occupants of the vehicle driven by defendant Heimberg
(hereinafter referred to as the "Heimberg vehicle") and rewe:
their engine as if they wanted to race

(T. 123).

Near North Temple Street a passenger in the Heimberq
vehicle threw firecrackers at the Leyba vehicle
B.

(T. 145).

Race by Leyba Vehicle

The Leyba vehicle then accelerated up the hill north·
bound on State Street to Third North Street in Salt Lake citv,
followed by the Heimberg vehicle
turned right.

(T. 146).

The Leyba vehicle

The Heimberg vehicle turned left and drove

towards Columbia Street (T. 146).
C.

Fight by Capitol Building

The Leyba vehicle then turned around and passed the
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-3Reimberq vehicle at about the corner of Columbia Street (Main
Street) and Third North Street.

The Leyba vehicle turned north

on Columbia Street and stopped in the middle of the street.
Defendant Heimberg stopped his vehicle behind the Leyba vehicle
(T. 14 7).

Passengers of the Leyba vehicle got out, came back to
the Heimberg vehicle and started "bad-mouthing" its occupants
(T. 147).

After a further exchange of words, a fight broke out

between a passenger of each vehicle (T. 147, 148).

The passenger

from the Heimberg vehicle, a James Harris, hit and knocked down
a passenger from the Leyba vehicle, and kicked him while he lay
on the ground (T. 148).
D.

Race Down Victory Road

Mr. Harris qot back into the Heimberg vehicle, and
defendant Heimberg started up his truck and drove around the
Leyba vehicle down Victory Road towards Beck Street (T. 148, 149).
The Leyba vehicle followed the Heimberg vehicle at a
high rate of speed (T. 149).

Although Heimberg gave self-

serving testimony that he was not trying to get away from Leyba
(T. 153), witnesses testified that the two vehicles drove down
Victory Road at a rate of speed much faster than other cars
coming down Victory Road (T. 101).

Witnesses also testified

that the two vehicles appeared to be racing (T. 96, 100) • and
that the engine sounds of the two vehicles driven by the respective
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-4defendants just prior to their collision was louder than ::h,
engine sounds of other vehicles
E.

(T. 94).

Collision

The two vehicles collided at or near the intersectl:
of Beck Street and Victory Road (T. 149, 150).

The

Heimbe~?

vehicle crashed through plaintiff's gasoline station,

knoct~

over several gasoline pumps and light poles and starting a fr
which damaged plaintiff's gasoline station, and caused lost
profits.
150 t

The total damages equal $20,594.17

(T. 107, 113, L

163) •
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1.

The trial court erred in re fusing to allow test:

mony concerning the speed of the defendants' vehicles at the
time of the collision between the two vehicles.
2.

The evidence is sufficient to support a finding

that defendant-respondent Heimberg was negligent.
3.

The evidence is sufficient to support a finding

that defendant-respondent Heimberg' s negligence was the prox:·
mate cause of plaintiff-appellant's damages.
4.

The trial court in granting a directed verdict:

defendant-respondent Heimberg improperly refused to submit t:·
issue of his negligence to the jury.
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-5ARGUMENT
Point 1.

The trial court erred in refusing to allow

testimony concerning the speed of defendants' vehicles at the
time of the collision between the two vehicles.
The trial court should have allowed the testimony of
Barry Bell with respect to the speed the two pickup trucks driven
by defendants were traveling at the time of the collision between
the two vehicles.

Mr. Bell observed the vehicles for a few

seconds prior to their collision and actually saw them collide
(T. 94).

He heard the loud engine noises (T. 94), and he was

only approximately 75 yards from the point of impact (T. 95).
~1r.

Bell has observed, in his words, "millions" of cars driving

down Victory Road

(T. 95), knows approximately how fast cars are

traveling as they drive down Victory Road (T. 96), and knows that
the posted speed limit is 50 miles per hour at that location
(T. 95).
racing

He testified that the trucks looked like they were

(T. 96).
The general rule accepted by jurisdictions which have

examined this issue is that any person of ordinary intelligence,
who has an opportunity for observation, is competent to testify
as to the rate of speed of a moving vehicle.
followed by the court of Appeals of Arizona in
Whatton,

21 Ariz. App. 556, 521 P.2d 1014

This rule was
T~•nsend

vs.

(1974), an action

for injuries and property damage sustained when plaintiff's car
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-6was struck by defendant's car after the plaintiff driver tur:
onto the road in front of the defendant's car.

The trial cc.

refused to allow plaintiff's witness to testify that the de'.;
dant was drag racing just prior to the accident, and plainti:
claimed error.

The Court of Appeals did not agree with the:

court and said:
A non-expert witness, where qualified
by sufficient experience, may qive an
opinion as to the speed of a vehicle
if there has been a reasonable opportunity to observe it.
Even a nondriver may be sufficiently qualified
to give an estimate of speed.
521
P.2d at 1016; citations omitted.
The Townsend court went on to hold that non-expert testimon7
that the defendant was driving in excess of a reasonable and
prudent speed was inadmissible, but that the estimate of spe;
"should be couched in terms of miles per hour, fast or slow,
521 P.2d at 1016.

etc.

The case was reversed and

ff

to the trial court for a new trial.
In the matter of Potts vs. Brown, 452 P.2d 975 (Wye.
19 69),

the Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for plainti'

The Potts case was an action for personal injuries sustained
when vehicles driven by plaintiff and defendant collided at'
uncontrolled,

ninety-degree intersection.

Witnesses, inclui.

two minor children, were allowed to testify over the objecti:
of the defendant as to the speed of the vehicles involved, ''
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the defendant

a~pealed.

The court stated:

. . . [A] witness who observed the
moving object in question will be
permitted to estiniate its speed if
he oossesses some knowledge or
experience, however slight, which
will enable him to form an opinion.
The qualification of the witness to
judge accurately goes to the weight
which the jury may give his testimony
rather than to its competency. 452
P.2d at 976.
The holdings of the cases cited above follow the reasoning of
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
(1)
If the witness is not testifying
as an expert his testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited
to such opinions or inferences as the
judge finds (a) may be rationally
based on the perception of the witness
and (b) are helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or to the
determination of the fact in issue.

* * *
(4)
Testimonv in the form of opinions
or inferences-otherwise admissible
under these rules is not objectionable
because it embraces the ultimate issue
or issues to be decided by the trier
of the fact.
Mr. Bell possessed experience with moving vehicles in
the vicinity of the collision of the defendants' vehicles in
this case.

He is of reasonable intelligence and actually

observ<"d the vehicles in question.

He was qualified to give

opinion testimony as to the speed of the vehicles at the time
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-8of the accident.

His opinion is based on his perception o::

incident, and it is helpful to the determination of the issu'
of defendant-respondent's negligence.
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as
follows:
A verdict or finding shall not be
set aside, nor shall the judgment
or decision based thereon be reversed,
by reason of the erroneous exclusion
of evidence unless (a) it appears of
record that the proponent of the evidence either made known the substance
of the evidence in a form and by a
method approved by the judge, or
indicated the substance of the expected
evidence by questions indicating the
desired answers, and (b) the court which
passes upon the effect of the error
or errors is of the opinion that the
excluded evidence would probably have
had a substantial influence in bringing
about a different verdict or finding.
Plaintiff-appellant indicated the substance of the
expected evidence of the speed defendants were traveling at
the time of the accident by questions indicating the desired
answers (T. 95).

The excluded evidence of the defendants'

speed at the time of the accident would have a substantial
influence in bringing about a denial of defendant-responden:'
directed verdict motion, and was crucial to plaintiff-appefr
case.

The trial court should have allowed testimony of the

speed of defendants' vehicles at the time of their collisioi,
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-9Fai lure to allow the evidence of speed is prejudicial and
reversible error.
Point 2.

The evidence is sufficient to support a

finding that defendant-respondent Heirnberg was negligent.
A.

Evidence of Racing

Witnesses who observed the defendants' vehicles
immediately prior to the collision gave direct testimony that
th<" vehicles were racing or otherwise traveling at a high rate
of spRed (T. 96, 100).

Their engine sounds were louder than

engine sounds of other vehicles (T. 94), and the trucks were
going faster than most other cars which drive down Victory Road
(T. 101).
Also, the defendant-respondent Heimberg himself testified of facts from which a jury could infer that the vehicles
were racing or involved in a chase or high-speed pursuit at the
time of the accident.

A few minutes prior to the accident the

Leyba vehicle's occupants yelled at the Heirnberg vehicle and
revved their engine as though they wanted to race (T. 123).
Firecrackers were thrown by at least one occupant of the Heirnberg
vehicle

(T. 145).

There had been, by analogy, an "offer" and

"acceptance" of some form of confrontation.

The confrontation

or joint activity continued as the Leyba vehicle raced up State
Street towards the Capitol.

This "cat and mouse" game did not

terminate when Leyba turned right and Heimberg turned left on
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-10Third North Street.

Once the joint activity had begun, it

could only terminate upon mutual agreement.
The joint activity continued on Columbia Street, wh.,
Leyba stopped his truck in front of Heimberg' s truck (T. l4i
Heimberg could perhaps have avoided further contact with the
Leyba vehicle, but chose to stop his truck behind the Ley'1a
vehicle.

At that point a fight broke out between occuoants

the vehicles, and a passenger of the Heimberg vehicle knocke.
down and kicked a passenger of the Leyba vehicle (T. 147, JJ
Heimberg then let the passenger who had been involved in th1
fight back into his vehicle and he left the scene of the fiq
with the Leyba vehicle behind him (T. 148, 149).

~1oments

lr

the vehicles collided while, according to the testimony of
witnesses,

they appeared to be racing
B.

(T. 9 6, 100, 14 8, 149!

Racing as a Violation of a
Statutory Duty of Care

Racing an automobile on the public highways in the
State of Utah is a viola ti on of the statutory duty of care '
forth in Section 41-6-51 (a), Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as

amended):
No person shall engage in any
motor vehicle speed contest or exhibition of speed on a highway .
The comparable Salt Lake City Ordinance is § 41-6-119:
No person shall engage in any
vehicle speed contest or exhibition,
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-11or in any vehicle acceleration contest
or exhibition on any street or alley.
C.

Racing as Negligence

Other jurisdictions, and early Utah cases cited in
Thompson vs. Ford Motor Companv, 16 Utah 2d 30, 365 P.2d 62
(1964), in examininq the violation of a duty of care fixed by
law or ordinance where the law or ordinance is instituted for
the safety of life, limb, or property, have gone so far as to
hold that violation of such duty is negligence as a matter of
law.
In Newcomb vs. Cassidy, 245 N.E.2d 846 (Ind. App. 1969),
the guardian of a minor brought an action against allegedly
racing automobile drivers to recover for injuries sustained by
the minor when the vehicle in which the minor was a passenger
was involved in an accident.

When the trial court granted

summary judgment for both defendants, plaintiff appealed.
The Appellate Court of Indiana, in reversing the trial
court's decision, held that a genuine issue of material fact
existed,

i.e., whether there was a race or speed contest, and

stated,
The racing of motor vehicles on a public
highway is negligence and the drivers
who engage in speed contests are each
liable for injuries to third persons
regardless of which of the racing vehicles
actually inflicted the injury and even
though there is no contact between the
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-12racing vehicles.

245 N.E.2d at 851.

Racing motor vehicles on a public highway has also:
held to be negligence per se in Jonas vs. Peterson, 279 Minn.
241, 156 N.W.2d 773

(1968), where, following a fatal accident

during a race on a public highway, the trustee for the:

n~xt:

kin brought a wrongful death action against the driver oft;,;
vehicle in which the decedent was riding and against the drr.
of the other vehicle.
defendants appeale:d.

Upon judgment for the: plaintiff, the
The Supreme Court of Minnesota

affirn~c

the trial court's decision, stating:
We agree with the trial judge that
this [preceding at a high rate of
speed and apparently racing] constitutes negligence as a matter of
law and we find nothing . . . cited
by defendants . • • requiring us to
hold otherwise.
156 N.W.2d at 737.
The leading case in the State of Utah on the matter
of whether the violation of a statutory duty of care is negL
gence as a matter of law is Thompson vs. Ford Motor Companv,
supra.

In Thompson the plaintiff sued to recover for injuri'

received when a parked garbage truck of which he was in char~·
suddenly gave way, throwing him to the ground.

The trial

CO'-

he ld that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a ma:
of law for violating the "unattended vehicle" statute, § 41·;.
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), and granted the defer·
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-13dant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff appealed.

The Utah Supreme Court examined Utah common law on
the issue of statute violation as evidence of negligence, and
held that violation of a standard of safety set by statute or
ordinance is to be regarded as prima facie evidence of negligence, but is subject to justification or excuse.
at 33, 34.

16 Utah 2d

The matter was remanded to the trial court for a

presentation of the disputed issues.
In the case at bar, defendant-respondent Heimberg
gave no justification or excuse for his participation in a
race, chase or high-speed pursuit in which he was engaged at
the time of the accident.
D.

Abandonment of Race by One Party Does
Not Terminate Liability

In the case of Lemons vs. Kellv, 239 Ore. 354, 397
P.2d 784 (1964), a passenger injured when the car in which she
was riding was involved in an accident, sued her driver and the
driver of the other vehicle involved.

The jury concluded that

the defendants were racing at the time of the accident, and
that the racing was the cause of the accident and plaintiff's
injuries.

From a verdict for plaintiff, the defendants appealed

on the grounds that the race had terminated by the time of the
accident.
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The Supreme Court of Oregon stated the general r:.;:;
"There can be no doubt that liability
for injury to a third person is imposed
upon all participants in an automobile
race even though only one vehicle is
actually involved in an accident."
397 P.2d at 785.
With regards to the alleged termination of the rac 2
by defendants, the court stated:
It is said in all of the authorities
cited that racing on a highway is hazardous
to all other persons upon the highway and
that the actor participates at his peril
• . . • One who does participate in setting
in motion such hazardous conduct cannot
thereafter turn his liability off like a
light switch. From the authorities cited
we conclude that one who participates in
setting such hazardous conduct in motion
cannot later be heard to say:
"Oh! I
withdrew before harm resulted even though
no one else was aware of my withdrawal."
It would be a reasonable probability that
the excitement and stimulus created by
this race of several miles had not dissipated
nor, in fact, terminated at all, in the
fraction of a minute in time beuveen the
act of passing and the accident. The
state of mind of the participants was material.
We cannot gauge that state of mind to the
point of saying that the stimulus or intent
had ended. The evidence warrants a finding
that i t did continue.
It would be for the
jury to decide if the racing were the cause
of the accident.
397 P. 2d at 787.
(Citations omitted.)
The Lemon court held that all participants in a race are c1v:
liable for injuries to a third person which results from t.~i
race.
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-15Plaintiff 's evidence of defendant-respondent Heirnberg's
racing by witnesses who actually saw the vehicles immediately
prior to the accident (T. 96, 100, 101) , and who heard the loud
engine noises of the respective vehicles (T. 94), and evidence
of "fooling around" and a fight just before the accident (T. 146
to 150), is evidence from which the jury could conclude that
Heirnberg was participating in a race, chase or high-speed pursuit
without cause or justification and was negligent in operating
his vehicle at the time of the accident.
Poin~

3.

The evidence is sufficient to support a

finding that defendant-respondent Heimberg's negligence was
the proximate cause of plaintiff-appellant's damages.
A.

Definition of "Proximate Cause"

This court has defined "proximate cause" of an injury
in Cox vs. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P. 2d 1047 (1953) as "the
primary moving cause without which it would not have been
inflicted, but which, in the natural and probable sequence of
events, and without the intervention of any new or independent
cause, produces the injury."

123 Utah at 89, 90.

There can be more than one proximate cause.

In Hillyard

vs. Utah Bv-Products co., l Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953), an
action to recover for wrongful death to a passenger of a vehicle
which struck an improperly parked truck, this court stated:
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It has frequently been recognized that
more than one separate act of negligence,
even though they do not happen simul taneouslv,
may be proximate causes of an injury.
1 Utah
2d at 147.
The court in this landmark decision went on to say:
One is guilty of negligence when he does
such an act or omits to take such a
precaution that under the circumstances
present, as an ordinary prudent person,
he ought reasonably to foresee that he
will thereby expose the interests of
another to an unreasonable risk of
harm. When one does so he may be held
liable for any resulting injuries
caused by any reasonably foreseeable
conduct whether it be innocent, negligent, or even criminal. Hillyard, ~
at 147.
B.

Test of Foreseeability

The test of liability is not whether the defendant

could have foreseen the precise form in which the injury ace·.
resulted, but whether the damage or injury appears to have
a natural and probable consequence of his act.

c·

If the act:'

one which he could have anticipated as likely to result in
injury, although he could not have anticipated the part1cuk
injury which did occur, liability would attach.

Hillyard,~

at 148.
"The •

. test", stated this court in Watters vs.

Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah, 1978), "is whether under the pa:·
cular circumstances [the defendant] should have foreseen tha:
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-17his conduct would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk
of harm; and this includes situations where negligent or other
wrongful conduct of others should reasonably be anticipated."
588 P.2d at 704.

Racing in pickup trucks at night is an activity in
which the likelihood of a serious injury is great.

With auto-

mobile racing, as the public has been well-educated, lives are
at stake, and serious property damage may occur.

To the

reasonable and prudent man, serious damage and injury is readily
foreseeable.
In a race or chase, especially after an exchange of
words and a fight as happened in this case (T. 145, 147, 148),
a reasonable and prudent man would be on notice of the other
driver's probable negligence or other irrational or criminal
act.
C.

Heirnberg as the Cause-in-Fact

Heirnberg's participation in the negligent act of racing
was the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's damage.

His vehicle

smashed into plaintiff's service station and set it on fire in
a literal cause-and-effect sense (T. 97, 98, 150).
The cause-in-fact relationship between plaintiff's
damagf'>s and Heirnberg' s wrongful conduct is the proximate cause
of plaintiff's damages.

Participation by Heirnberg in the race,
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-18chase or high-speed pursuit was the primary moving cause o:
damages.

But for that participation, the accident would no-

have happened and plaintiff-appellant's service
have been damaged.

station~~

The accident was in the natural and pre:

sequence of events and a reasonable and prudent man should'
foreseen that a traffic accident could occur as a result o'.
Heirnberg's actions.
A reasonable man in Heimberg' s circumstances, espec.
after the fight at the top of the hill

(T. 147, 148), wocld

avoided the risk by slowing down to a safe speed, by avoid1:.
the "goofing off" which occurred while driving or riding in
automobiles, by turning from potential conflicts rather thar.
stopping to participate or to allow fellow passengers to par
cipate, or by taking other reasonable action.

But Heirnberg

not willing to make the small sacrifice to avoid the risk o:
great harm and injury and he continued in the confrontation
until the time the accident occured.
D.

Leyba's Negligence Not an Independent,
Intervening Act

The collision with the Heirnberg vehicle by the Leyt
vehicle

(T. 149, 150) was not an independent intervening ca':

which superseded the negligence of Heimberg,

thereby insula'.:

Heirnberg' s negligence from being a substantial factor in cac
the collision with plaintiff's service station and relievinc
Heirnberg from liability.

Heimberg should have realized thac
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the Leyba vehicle could have been involved in an accident with
the Heimberg vehicle or with third parties during the course
of the race or chase.

A reasonable man knowing the situation

would not regard the collision between the two vehicles as
highly extraordinary, and the purported intervening act is a
normal response to the race or chase in which Heimberg participated.
The defendant who owned the parked truck in Hillyard,
supra, argued as a matter of law that the negligence of the
driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding was
an intervening act which superseded the negligence in parking
the truck, thereby insulating that negligence from being a
substantial factor in causing the collision.

In addressing this

argument the court said:
The Restatement of the Law of Torts
essentially expressed the same concept in
a different manner:
"The fact that an intervening
act of a third person is negligent
in itself or is done in a negligent
manner does not make it a superseding
cause of harm to another which the
actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if:
" (a) The actor at the time
of his negligent conduct should have
realized that a third person might so
act, or
" (b) A reasonable man knowing
the situation existing when the act of
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-20the third person was done would not
regard it as highly extraordinary that
the third person had so acted, or
" (c) The intervening act is
a normal response to a situation created
by the actor's conduct and the manner in
which i t is done is not extraordinarily
negligent."
The doctrine enunciated in the above
quotations is based upon the proposition
that one cannot excuse himself from liability
arising from his negligent acts merely
because the later negligence of another
concurs to cause an injury, if the later
act was a legally foreseeable event.
This is true particularly where,

in retrospect, the interve::.

act did not appear to be particularly unusual or extraorclin1
1 Utah 2d at 149

(footnotes omitted); quoted with approval;

Jensen vs. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Comnanv,
611 P.2d 363 (Utah, 1980).
E.

Piaintiff-Appellant May Sue Either Defendant
Plaintiff-appellant may sue either defendant, or be

of them, and it may recover judgments against one or both oi
them.

This court in Dawson vs. Board of Education of Weber

County School District, 118 Utah 452, 222 P.2d 590

(1950), •

action to recover for the wrongful death of a minor child fir
by a defendant as the child alighted from a school bus ownec
by the defendant school district, stated the widely recognlZ'
rule that having a single cause of action against more thane
tort feasor,

an injured party may proceed against the wrongc
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-21either jointly or severally and he may recover judgment or
judgments against one or all.

118 Utah at 456.

When two parties are jointly charged with negligence,
it is only necessary to show that both contributed to the
injury, notwithstanding the fact that one may have been wanton
and reckless, and the other simply manifested want of ordinary
caution.

Blackwell vs. American Film Co., 48 Cal. App. 681,

192 P. 189

(1920).

Blackwell is an action for personal injuries

arising from a head-on collision between two automobiles owned
by the defendants.

The court stated:

Although the act of each defendant
alone might not have caused the injury,
there is no good reason why each defendant should not be liable for the
damage caused by the different acts
of all.
192 P.2d at 190.
See also Annotation:

Joint Liability for Injury to Third Person

for Damage to His Property Due to Concurring Negligence of
Drivers of Automobiles, 62 ALR 1425 (1929).
Both Heimberg and Leyba contributed to the injury of
plaintiff-appellant by participating in the mutual activity of
racing or chasing (T. 96, 100, 101).

Even if Leyba intentionally

rammed his truck into Heimberg's vehicle, Heimberg would not be
relieved of liability because of his participation in the negligent act.
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-22Point 4.

The trial court in granting a directed.,.,

for defPndant-respondent Heimberg irnproperlv refused to sue·
issues of his negligence and the proximate cause of th"' pl;.
appellant's damages to the jurv.
The directed verdict law in the State of Utah is

5.

forth in the recent Supreme Court case, Kirn vs. Anderson,>.
P.2d 1270

(Utah 1980).

Kirn vs. Anderson was a malpractice:

wherein the plaintiff alleged the defendant negligently drc:
a drill bit down the plaintiff's throat during a root cana:
operation.

When the trial court granted defendant's rnotior.

a directed verdict for failure to present expert testimony:
to the required standard of care and the viola ti on thereof,
plaintiff appealed to this court.
This court vacated the order and remanded for fur::.
proceedings, holding that expert testirrony was not required
under the facts of the case, and further stated:
In directing a verdict, the trial court
should examine the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party against whom
the motion is made.
On appeal, we view
the evidence in the same manner and if
there is a reasonable basis therein, and
the inferences which may be drawn therefrom,
which would support a judgment in favor of
the losing party below, a judgment based on
a directed verdict cannot be sustained.
(610 P.2d at 1271; footnotes omitted.)
This court has further stated in the matter of
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-23Boskovich vs. Utah Construction Company, 123 Utah 387, 259 P. 2d
885 (1953), an action to recover for a balance alleged to be

J:

due under an alleged oral guarantee of payment for use of
plaintiff's pa tended machine, that "the court must consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion is directed and must resolve every controverted
fact in his favor."

123 Utah at 390.

From a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff
after defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied in
an action for personal injuries when a father attempted to
rescue his minor son from a dangerous situation in defendant's
railroad yard, the defendant appealed.

This court in affirming

the trial court's decision stated that the non-moving party's
evidence must be taken as true and every legitimate inference
drawn in its favor.

Christensen vs. Los Angeles and S.L.R. Co.,

77 Utah 85, 90, 291 P. 926 (1930).
This court has also held that it is not the province
of the trial court to weigh or determine the preponderance of
the evidence in Finlayson vs. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491
(1952), an action for damages for the price of defective gas
heaters and for loss of rentals where defendants counterclaimed
for the balance due under a conditional sales contract for the
purchase of the heaters.

The trial court directed a verdict

for defendant on plaintiff's complaint and awarded a rroney judg-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-24rnent on defendant's counterclaim.

The Supreme Court on apPE

found substantial contradictory evidence on both sides whic:.
required giving the case to the jury, reversed the trial co.
order, and remanded for a new trial.
If, in granting defendant-respondent's motion for;
directed verdict, the trial court considered Heimberg' s tes:
mony that he drove away from the scene of the fight at a no::
speed (T. 153), thereby inferring that the confrontations
between the defendants had terminated, then the court irnproc;
weighed the preponderance of the evidence.

The issues of

Heimberg's negligence and its being the ·proximate cause of
plaintiff-appellant's damages should have been given to the
jury and Heirnberg's directed verdict motion denied.
App lying the Kirn vs. Anderson rule cited above at p;
22, the trial court in the present case improperly granted a
directed verdict to defendant-respondent He irnberg.

Plaintif'.

appellant produced competent, uncontroverted evidence of
Heirnberg's racing (T. 96, 100, 101), and further evidence
(T.

94, 118 to 121, 123, 145 to 150)

from which a jury could

reasonably infer that Heirnberg and Leyba were involved in a
race or chase or other high-speed pursuit during which the1:
respective vehicles collided, sending Heimberg' s vehicle eras·
into the Little America Service Station.

Such evidence, if

taken as true, and in a light most favorable to plaintiff-ac:
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-25is sufficient to support a judgment for plaintiff-appellant.
CONCLUSION

The trial court should have allowed testimony concerning the speed of the defendants' vehicles at the time of
the accident.

Refusal to admit such testimony is reversible

error.
Plaintiff-appellant produced competent evidence that
defendant-respondent Heimberg was involved in a race or chase
on a public highway at the time of the accident in this case.
Additional competent evidence was produced from which the jury
could infer that the defendants were racing or chasing each
other at the time of the accident.

Such a course of action

would create a dangerous situation in which a reasonable and
prudent person could easily foresee that a third party could
be injured or damaged.
Defendant-respondent's negligent conduct, without which
the damages to plaintiff-appellant's service station would not
have occurred, was a proximate cause of said damages.
Taking all of plaintiff-appellant's evidence as true,
the trial court should not have granted the motion for directed
verdict.

The issues of negligence and proximate cause should

have been given to the jury and the directed verdict motion
denied.

To allow Heimberg to be free from liability under the

facts of this case would encourage racing on public highways
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-26and create imminent hazards to other users of the public hi~
ways and to those whose property adjoins the highways.
The trial court's Order Directing Verdict for Defen
Sven Heimberg should be reversed and the case remanded fora
new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP

Johnson
s for Plaintiff-Appel'
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